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PROCEDURAL PREDICTABILITY AND THE EMPLOYER
AS LITIGATOR: THE SUPREME COURT’S
2012-2013 TERM
Scott R. Bauries∗
ABSTRACT
In this contribution to the University of Louisville Law Review’s Annual
Carl A. Warns Labor and Employment Institute issue, I examine the
Supreme Court’s labor and employment-related decisions from the October
Term 2012 (OT 2012). I argue that the Court’s decisions assisted
employers as litigators—as repeat players in the employment dispute
resolution system—in two ways. First, the Court established simple
contract drafting strategies that employers may use to limit their exposure to
employment claims. Second, the Court adopted bright-line interpretations
of employment statutes. Both forms of assistance served a formalist
interest in what I term “procedural predictability”—enhanced employer
predictability and control of both the duration and costs of resolving
employment disputes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In each year of the Roberts Court’s tenure, at least one labor and
employment law scholar has analyzed the Court’s treatment of its labor and
employment-related cases.1 Recent reviews of the Roberts Court’s work

∗ Robert G. Lawson Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. I would like to thank
the organizers of the 30th Annual Carl A. Warns, Jr. Labor & Employment Institute, hosted by the Louis
D. Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville for inviting me to speak in June 2013, and the
editors of the University of Louisville Law Review for inviting me to contribute to this issue.
1
See Mark W. Bennett, Review of Labor and Employment Law Decisions from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 2011-2012 Term, 28 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 169 (2013); Christine Cooper, Employment
Cases from the 2006-2007 Supreme Court Term, 23 LAB. LAW. 223 (2008); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt &
Todd Dvorak, Review of Labor and Employment Decisions from the United States Supreme Court’s
2008-2009 Term, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 107 (2010); Melissa Hart, Business-Like: The Supreme
Court’s 2009-2010 Labor and Employment Decisions, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 207 (2010); L.
Camille Hébert, The Supreme Court’s 2011-2012 Labor and Employment Law Decisions: From the
Controversial to the Peripheral, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 287 (2012); L. Camille Hébert, The
Supreme Court’s 2010-2011 Labor and Employment Law Decisions: A Large and “Mixed Bag” for
Employers and Employees, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 279 (2011); Robert J. Rabin, A Review of the
Supreme Court’s Labor and Employment Law Decisions: 2005-2006 Term, 22 LAB. LAW. 115 (2006);
Charles A. Shanor, Employment Cases from the 2007-2008 Supreme Court Term, 24 LAB. LAW. 147
(2008). Chief Justice John Roberts joined the Court, replacing Chief Justice William Rehnquist, during
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have focused often on the Court’s ideological or political preferences, as
revealed in the outcomes of its cases.2 But, as Professor Matt Bodie points
out, in labor and employment cases, the expected ideological alignments
often do not materialize.3 Moreover, a focus on which party was favored in
the Court’s ultimate disposition of a case may mask information that is
more useful in understanding the Court’s work—particularly which parties’
interests were ultimately served by a decision, regardless of who prevailed
in the case before the Court.
A “liberal” ruling can achieve a “conservative” victory, as we saw
recently with the Court’s ruling in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius.4 In that case, President Barack Obama’s signature
health care overhaul, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(Affordable Care Act)5 was upheld 5–4, but along the way to that ruling, the
operative opinion adopted a principle of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
that decidedly favored a more limited reach for the federal government—
that the Commerce Clause, even read in light of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, may not be used to compel participation in a particular commercial
market.6 What is within the state police power for regulating intrastate
commerce is therefore outside the federal commerce power,7 but not
because the particular market for health insurance is not an “interstate” one
or because selling health insurance is not “commerce”8—rather, because the
mechanism used compels, rather than prohibits or limits, conduct within the
market.9
A researcher interested in “case outcomes” might code the Sebelius
case as a “liberal” victory, as the ultimate result was to uphold the
Affordable Care Act (the signature legislative accomplishment of a
the 2005-2006 term. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited May 5, 2014).
2
See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 1; Shanor, supra note 1.
3
See Matthew T. Bodie, The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Resources, 34 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 57), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c
fm?abstract_id=2273843; see also, e.g., Shanor, supra note 1, at 149 (expressing surprise at the
unexpected lineups of justices in each case in the 2007-2008 term, particularly at Justice Scalia
dissenting to an opinion favoring the employer).
4
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
5
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
6
See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2593.
7
It is clear that states may compel their residents to participate in commerce. See, e.g., KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 304.39-080(5) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. & 2013 Extra. Sess.) (requiring
the purchase of liability and minimal property damage insurance as a condition of operating a motor
vehicle in Kentucky).
8
See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
9
See id. Although the dissenting Justices emphatically declined to join Chief Justice Roberts’s
operative opinion on the point, it is clear from the dissent that they would support the application of the
Chief Justice’s Commerce Clause rule in a subsequent case. See id. at 2644–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Democratic president) as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxation power.10
But a more nuanced look at the case reveals that it was as much a long-term
victory for conservative proponents of a limited federal government as it
was an immediate victory for liberal proponents of universal health
coverage.11 In short, focusing on which side wins or loses a case before the
Court has the potential to mask who really “wins” as a result of the Court’s
decision. This latter sense of “wins” refers to the legal actors who
ultimately benefit as a result of the principles of law that govern such a
decision, rather than the immediate resolution of the case itself. In this
sense, just as a “liberal” outcome can mask a “conservative” victory, a
particular case outcome favoring an employee can mask an overall victory
for employers, and vice versa.
Employers are repeat players in the system of employment dispute
resolution.12 Unlike the average employee, who may become involved in a
formal employment dispute that matures into a lawsuit or arbitration once in
a career, if at all, employers frequently find themselves in court or in
arbitration in disputes with their employees.13 As repeat players, employers
have an interest in seeing the law of employment develop in two ways.
First, for obvious reasons, employers have an interest in the adoption of
narrow or restrictive interpretations of the civil rights statutes, which lessen
the duties they owe to their employees. Second, and perhaps less
obviously, employers have an interest in the adoption of bright-line rules of
decision in employment cases. Such rules allow employers to predict more
accurately the resolution of particular cases, which allows them to predict
the likely duration of each dispute, as well as the costs of resolution,
including settlement costs.
Narrow interpretations of the statutes’ coverage or the duties they
impose in the workplace are often difficult to sell politically and judicially,
as evidenced by the Court’s expansive recent interpretation of the retaliation

10

There are numerous such studies. See, e.g., Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We
Talk About Ideology: Judicial Politics Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
231, 236 n.15 (2009) (collecting studies). Even studies assessing influences beyond political ideology
fall victim to this focus on ultimate winners and losers of the instant case—as they must, given the
constraints of empirical coding. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional
Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2001) (a careful and rigorous study
that attempts to account for several interrelated influences on judging but limits its analysis to the
winners and losers of particular cases).
11
See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 47–50 (2013) (arguing that
the decision is a continuation of the Rehnquist Court’s focus on federalism as a constitutional principle).
12
Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189,
190 (1997).
13
Id.
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provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to cover those who have not
themselves engaged in protected activity, but who are closely related to
employees who have engaged in protected activity.14 But bright-line rules
of decision relating to the proof of employment claims are just as valuable,
and seemingly more palatable to some of the Justices. A bright-line rule of
decision may not absolve private employers of their duty not to
discriminate, or even limit this duty in any way, but such a rule can make
the litigation of employment claims much more predictable—and therefore
much less expensive—for employers.
This Article will demonstrate that the OT 2012 cases (with one
exception) established bright-line rules of decision that increased the
predictability of the duration and costs of resolving employment disputes—
what I term “procedural predictability.” This pursuit of procedural
predictability served the interests of employers as repeat players in the
employment dispute resolution system by making that system much more
manageable at earlier stages than it was previously. I argue that, in the OT
2012 cases, the Court assisted employers as litigators in two primary ways.
First, the Court established formalistic, bright-line rules of decision for
contract disputes touching and concerning the workplace.15 These rules of
decision signal to employers the drafting strategies that they may adopt to
lessen their costs and time spent resolving employment disputes. Second,
the Court adopted formalistic, bright-line rules of decision for employment
claims based on civil rights statutes.16 These rules will have the effect of
affording employers more control over statutory disputes at the early stages
of each case—thus lessening their costs and time expended. Importantly,
these mechanisms operated regardless of whether the employer-side party
won each individual case before the Court.
I begin by examining each of the cases that can plausibly be considered
a “labor and employment case” on the OT 2012 docket. Then, I show that
the principles of law laid down in each of the cases—regardless of which
party came out victorious before the Court—greatly favored employers as
repeat players, and generally did so by pursuing greater procedural
predictability for employers. I conclude with some preliminary thoughts as
to the Court’s pursuit of procedural predictability as a goal in its decision
making.

14
See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863, 867, 870 (2011) (unanimously interpreting
the Act to extend to the fiancé of the employee who engaged in protected activity, though the employee
who engaged in protected activity did not make a retaliation claim herself).
15
See infra Part III.A.
16
See infra Part III.B.
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II. THE OT 2012 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT CASES
The OT 2012 docket contained very few cases that can properly be
termed “labor and employment law cases.” The Court did not consider any
labor law cases, and its pure employment law cases—those involving
principles unique to the employment context—could be counted on one
hand. The total of eight Supreme Court decisions at least touching and
concerning labor and employment can be usefully divided into two strands.
The first strand contains the Court’s contract cases.17 These cases involved
employee benefits plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) or arbitration contracts, which have long been important to
labor law and are increasing in their importance to employment law. The
second strand contains the Court’s statutory interpretation cases.18 These
cases involved interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the Civil Service
Reform Act (CSRA). I consider the four contract cases before moving on
to the four statutory interpretation cases.
A. The Contract Cases
The law of arbitration applies trans-substantively.19 That is, the case
law developed under the Federal Arbitration Act20 applies regardless of the
substance of the underlying dispute that might be arbitrated.21 Because a
good deal of both employment and labor dispute resolution now involves
arbitration, the law of arbitration is very important to employment and labor
law, and the Supreme Court’s three arbitration decisions in OT 2012 will all
have effects on the resolution of workplace disputes.
It is plausible to claim that, in enforcing what it calls “a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration,”22 the Supreme Court has developed a unique

17
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health Plans L.L.C. v.
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013); Nitro-Lift
Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012).
18
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S.
Ct. 2434 (2013); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013); Kloeckner v. Solis, 133
S. Ct. 596 (2012).
19
Cf. Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 729,
770 (2012) (calling for a thicker body of federal common law including contract defenses to stabilize
this area of law).
20
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012).
21
Yelnosky, supra note 19, at 731.
22
AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
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branch of contract law as federal common law.23 This body of contract
doctrine has steadily developed over time to ensure that parties seeking to
compel arbitration of their disputes, including employers, are able to access
arbitration with less and less trouble. In developing the law in this way, the
Court has protected the long-term interests of employers as repeat players in
the employment dispute resolution system, and has done so by making both
the duration and the costs of employment disputes more predictable for
employers. The three arbitration cases the Court decided in the most recent
term are no exception to these principles.
The first of these three cases that I will discuss is Oxford Health Plans,
LLC v. Sutter,24 decided on June 10, 2013. Sutter arose out of an
employment arbitration, but the question to be decided was one of general
arbitration law, not a question of employment law as a unique doctrinal
area.25 The case had as its background the Court’s recent decision in StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,26 holding that class
arbitration is only available if the parties have specifically agreed to it in the
arbitration agreement.27 The plaintiff in Sutter requested class treatment
from the arbitrator, but the contract was silent as to whether the parties
agreed to allow such treatment.28 Nevertheless, the arbitrator interpreted
the contract to allow for class treatment.29 Thus, the question for the Court
became whether Stolt-Nielsen required explicit, textual agreement or simply
an agreement discoverable through contract interpretation, and if the latter,
under what circumstances such an interpretation might be reversed on
further review.30
Oxford Health’s argument in the Supreme Court was that Stolt-Nielsen
required an explicit, textual agreement.31 The Court, however, unanimously
agreed with Sutter and the arbitrator to the contrary.32 Citing the Court’s
longstanding practice of recognizing the power of the arbitrator to interpret
the arbitration agreement, and deferring substantially to such interpretive
decisions,33 the Court held that the arbitrator’s decision that the parties had
agreed to class arbitration was not arbitrary or capricious.34 The Court

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

See Yelnosky, supra note 19, at 730–34.
Oxford Health Plans L.L.C. v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013).
Id. at 2068.
Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
Id. at 687.
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2067.
Id.
Id. at 2068.
Id. at 2069.
Id. at 2066, 2070.
Id. at 2070–71.
Id. at 2071.
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distinguished Stolt-Nielsen on the basis that the parties to that case had
stipulated their failure to reach agreement as to class arbitration,35 whereas
the Sutter parties contested whether they had reached agreement,36 thus
leaving it to the arbitrator to resolve the point through interpretation.37
Another OT 2012 arbitration case that affected employment, while
having neither employers nor employees as parties in those capacities, is
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.38 In Italian Colors, a
credit card company included a prohibition against class arbitration
explicitly in the agreement it entered with the users of its services.39 Italian
Colors Restaurant and other merchants that accepted American Express
charge and credit cards in their establishments sued American Express for
using its market power in the area of “charge cards” to force merchants to
accept unfavorable terms governing “credit card” transactions.40 The
merchants claimed that this use of market power constituted a “tying”
arrangement and was therefore a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.41
They also sought to proceed as a class, despite the language of the identical
(in all relevant respects) agreement that each signed with American Express
explicitly prohibiting class treatment.42
The merchants contended that enforcement of the arbitration
prohibition in the agreement would have the impermissible effect of
preventing “‘effective vindication’ of a federal statutory right.”43 The
merchants argued that preventing class arbitration of relatively small
antitrust claims would place a substantial disincentive on litigating these
claims at all, given their small individual values and the marginal costs of
litigation.44 Essentially, their contention was that the expense of litigating
even a simple antitrust claim, including the costs of proving that claim
35

Id. at 2069–70.
Id. at 2070.
37
Id.
38
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
39
Id. at 2308 (“The agreement also provides that ‘[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be
arbitrated on a class action basis.’” (quoting In re Am Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2012))).
40
Id. Charge cards are less common than credit cards. See In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d at
207–08, rev'd sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). The basic difference
between the two is that the former does not allow a borrower to carry a balance from month to month. Italian
Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308 n.1. American Express has long been one of the most dominant charge card
companies in the world. See id. at 2308.
41
Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308; see Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). A
“tying” arrangement essentially forces those who want one product to also purchase another product, or
to purchase it on less favorable terms than would be offered if the purchase of the more desirable
product were not “tied” to its purchase. See In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d at 208 n.4.
42
Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308.
43
Id. at 2310.
44
Id.
36
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through economic expert witness testimony, would prevent the litigation of
any such simple claim from being economically beneficial to the plaintiff,
even if victorious.45 But the Court rejected this contention as a basis for
voiding the anti-class provision.46
The majority read the “effective vindication” exception as a narrow
prohibition on the enforcement of class arbitration waivers where such
waivers remove a party’s “right to pursue” a statutory violation completely,
such as where a class arbitration waiver contains an explicit, prospective
waiver of the statutory right itself, or imposes a confiscatory fee for the
arbitration.47 In the case before the Court, none of the parties would have
been completely prevented from “pursuing” their claims—it just would not
make economic sense for them to do so.48 Accordingly, the “effective
vindication” exception was inapplicable.49
The final arbitration case, Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard,50
like Sutter, arose out of the employment context—this time in relation to a
post-employment non-competition agreement.51 Nitro-Lift, unlike the other
cases reviewed here, was a short, unanimous, per curiam opinion.52 The
case presented a dispute between a service provider to oil and gas well
operators operating in Oklahoma, Texas, and Arkansas and two
employees.53 Both employees had signed employment agreements with
Nitro-Lift that prevented them from working for competitors of Nitro-Lift
for a period of time after their separation from employment with NitroLift.54 Despite the agreements, both employees resigned from Nitro-Lift
and went to work for one of its competitors shortly thereafter.55
Soon after learning of their new employment, Nitro-Lift served both
former employees with demands for arbitration.56 In response, the
employees filed their own suit in state court in Oklahoma, seeking a judicial
declaration that their employment agreements were invalid and
unenforceable.57 The trial court dismissed, citing the arbitration clause, but

45

Id. at 2308.
Id. at 2310.
47
Id. at 2310–11 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
n.19 (1985)).
48
Id. at 2310.
49
Id.
50
Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012).
51
Id. at 501–02.
52
Id. at 501.
53
Id. at 501–02.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 502.
56
Id.
57
Id.
46
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the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the existence of an
arbitration clause in a non-competition agreement cannot deprive the state’s
courts from deciding whether the agreement comports with the public
policy of the state.58 The court went on to hold that both agreements were
void as against the public policy of Oklahoma.59
Nitro-Lift appealed the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling to the
Supreme Court, which unanimously vacated the court’s decision in a per
curiam opinion.60 Citing Preston v. Ferrer,61 the Court applied the
established rule that, while challenges to the enforceability of a specific
provision mandating arbitration must be decided by a court, challenges to
the enforceability of the overall agreement itself must be decided by the
arbitrator.62 The challenge in Nitro-Lift was to the enforceability of the
non-competition restrictions, not the arbitration provision itself.63 Thus, the
Court rejected any “public policy” exception to the “arbitrator decides”
rule.64
ERISA65 has provided the Court with opportunities to engage both its
statutory interpretation function and its pure federal common lawmaking
function. Over time, the Court has developed a common law jurisprudence
of both contract law and general equity law as a way of implementing the
requirements of ERISA. OT 2012 provided the Court with an opportunity
to clarify the extent to which the Court will allow equitable doctrines to
affect the enforcement of the sorts of contracts falling under ERISA’s
preemptive umbrella—employee benefit plans.
In US Airways v. McCutchen,66 the plaintiff, McCutchen, was injured
and secured health benefits in the amount of $66,866 through his
employer’s benefits plan (the Plan), which was covered by ERISA.67
McCutchen then sued the third party who injured him, recovering
$110,000.68 After attorneys’ fees and costs, the plaintiff was left with

58
Id. (quoting Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 273 P.3d 20, 26 n.20, 27 (Okla. 2011), vacated, 133 S.
Ct. 500 (2012)).
59
Id.
60
Id. at 501.
61
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353–54 (2008) (holding that challenges to the validity of a
contract containing an arbitration agreement must be heard by the arbitrator); see also Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–404 (1967) (establishing the same rule for cases filed
in federal courts).
62
Nitro-Lift, 133 S. Ct. at 503.
63
Id. at 502.
64
Id. at 503.
65
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012).
66
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013).
67
Id. at 1543.
68
Id.
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$66,000—$866 less than the Plan had paid out in benefits.69 Under the
clear terms of the ERISA Plan, if an injured employee were to sue the third
party and recover more than the Plan expended for his care, the Plan was
entitled to recover all of its expenses from the injured employee, regardless
of the employee’s ultimate net recovery after paying attorneys’ fees and
costs.70 As the Court stated, this provision imposed an “equitable lien by
agreement” on the lawsuit proceeds, so the scope of the lien was best
determined by the language of the agreement, in this case, the ERISA
Plan.71 The Court’s resolution first applied the clear terms of the Plan to
award the Plan all of its expenses ($866 of which had to come out of
McCutchen’s pocket).72 That portion of the opinion was unanimous.73
But a 5–4 majority also found that the plan was “silent” as to how
attorneys’ fees and costs were to be split among the parties in the event of a
third party suit and recovery.74 This silence required the Court to interpret
the Plan in light of the equitable nature of the lien by agreement,75 and the
majority applied the “common fund” doctrine familiar to trust law to
allocate the costs of recovery proportionally.76 Four justices dissented on
this point, explaining that the case had come to the Court on the parties’
mutual stipulation that the terms of the plan were “unambiguous,” and that
it was therefore an overreach to apply any doctrines of interpretation,
including the common fund doctrine.77
B. The Statutory Interpretation Cases
The remaining four cases on the OT 2012 docket were statutory
interpretation cases (though one of them involved no interpretation at all).78
Two of these cases dealt with the proof requirements for violations of Title
VII, while the other two considered issues relating to subject matter
jurisdiction under the FLSA and the CSRA.

69

Id.
Id.
71
Id. at 1546.
72
Id. at 1548.
73
See id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating the dissenters’ agreement with Parts I and II but
disagreement with Parts III and IV).
74
Id. at 1543 (majority opinion). Under the common fund doctrine, “someone ‘who recovers a common
fund for the benefit of persons other than himself’ is due ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as whole.’”
Id. at 1550 (quoting Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)).
75
Id. at 1549.
76
Id. at 1550–51.
77
Id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78
See infra notes 162–188 and accompanying text (discussing Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596
(2012)).
70
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To begin, the Court decided two cases under Title VII,79 one involving
a federal judge-made affirmative defense and the other involving a standard
of causation. The first, Vance v. Ball State University,80 asked the Court to
determine whether a plaintiff’s co-worker who had some authority to assign
tasks to the plaintiff and otherwise direct her work activities qualified as a
“supervisor” for the purposes of the Faragher-Ellerth81 affirmative defense
to a hostile work environment claim under Title VII.82 The second,
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,83 asked the
Court to decide whether the “mixed motive” framework of causation
initially developed in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,84 and later codified in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,85 could be applied to a retaliation claim under
Title VII.86
Maetta Vance, a cafeteria employee at Ball State University, alleged
that another cafeteria worker named Saundra Davis had harassed her based
on her race.87 When the University learned of the alleged harassment
through Vance’s complaints, it acted to resolve the matter, but the alleged
harassment continued.88 Vance filed suit, and the District Court held, on
cross-motions for summary judgment, that the University had acted
reasonably in attempting to stop the behavior of Davis that constituted the
alleged harassment.89
The default rule of employer liability in harassment cases under Title
VII is one of direct liability for negligence on the employer’s own part.90
An employer is liable for harassment perpetrated by one of its employees
only if it knows or should know of harassment and does not act promptly
and reasonably to protect the victim of the harassment.91 So, based on the
University’s reasonable actions in attempting to remedy the alleged
79

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e—2000e17 (2012).
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
81
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998).
82
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443.
83
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
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Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
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Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522–23.
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Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439.
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Id. at 2440.
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Id.
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Katherine S. Anderson, Note, Employer Liability under Title VII for Sexual Harassment after
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1262 & n.30 (1987).
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See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1999) (“With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an
employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents
or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took
immediate and appropriate corrective action.”).
80
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harassment after Vance complained, the University could not be held liable
for Davis’s allegedly harassing acts.92
But this default rule applies only to the actions of “co-employees” of
the plaintiff.93 Under the Faragher-Ellerth doctrine, if the alleged harasser
is the supervisor of the alleged victim, then based on agency principles,
vicarious liability applies.94 There is, however, a potential affirmative
defense to such liability.95 Where harassment culminates in a “tangible
employment action,” such as termination, there is no affirmative defense to
it, as this is the familiar and especially pernicious form of harassment
known as “quid pro quo” harassment, which can never be justified.96 But
where the plaintiff complains of a hostile work environment that did not
culminate in a tangible employment action, an employer can establish an
affirmative defense against vicarious liability if the employer proves (1) that
it acted reasonably to prevent and promptly remedy any harassment, and (2)
that the employee-victim “unreasonably failed to take advantage of the
preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided.”97 That
is, the employer bears the burden of proving that its own actions were
reasonable—both as to preventing harassing conduct and promptly
remedying it once aware of it—and the employer must additionally prove
that the employee acted unreasonably in reporting the alleged harassment or
taking other steps to prevent or stop it.98
Vance was not terminated, reassigned, or demoted, but Vance did
contend that Davis was her supervisor, rather than a co-employee, in an
effort to force the University to prove the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative
defense to escape liability.99 The University disputed the claim that Davis
was Vance’s supervisor, and that was the issue on which the Court granted
certiorari.100 Vance contended that the Court should examine whether
Davis was her supervisor based on the particular facts of their working
relationship.101 Davis, at times, assigned work to Vance and directed her
duties, thus exercising at least some managerial control over Vance.102 The
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Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2440.
Anderson, supra note 90, at 1262.
94
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2442. For a comparative introduction to direct and vicarious liability, see
James Fleming, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161 (1954).
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Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2442.
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See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998).
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Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439 (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765).
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC’s) most recent
interpretation of the term “supervisor” was also in accord with Vance’s
desired approach.103
But the Supreme Court adopted the simpler, more formalistic approach
advanced by the University.104 Under the approach the Court adopted, the
only inquiry a court must make in determining whether an alleged harasser
was the supervisor of the victim is whether the alleged harasser had the
authority “to take tangible employment actions against the victim.”105 Such
actions might include anything that “effect[s] a ‘significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or . . . a significant change in
benefits.”106 In Vance, the alleged harasser, Davis, had some authority to
direct Vance’s work activities, but had no authority to hire her, fire her,
reassign her, promote her, or change her benefits.107 Therefore, Davis was
merely Vance’s co-employee, rather than her supervisor, eliminating the
possibility of vicarious liability.108 And because the University acted
reasonably to protect Vance once it was alerted to her complaints, the
University therefore was not directly liable for any harassment that Davis
might have committed.109
The other Title VII case, Nassar, also involved a university
employer.110 Nassar, a doctor at a university-affiliated hospital, complained
to his employer that his supervisor, Dr. Beth Levine, discriminated against
him based on his religion and his ethnic heritage.111 After lodging these
complaints, Nassar approached the University’s partner institution,
Parkland Memorial Hospital, about continuing to work for Parkland (under
different supervisors) as a staff physician, while discontinuing his affiliation
103
Id. (“In its Enforcement Guidance, the EEOC takes the position that an employee, in order to be
classified as a supervisor, must wield authority ‘of sufficient magnitude so as to assist the harasser
explicitly or implicitly in carrying out the harassment.’”). Importantly, as to its Enforcement Guidance,
the EEOC is not entitled to the normal deference associated with administrative rulemaking under
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1189 (2008). Rather, because
Congress did not specifically authorize the EEOC to enact interpretive regulations under the relevant
portions of Title VII, the EEOC’s interpretations are entitled only to deference under Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), meaning that, instead of deferring to any “reasonable” interpretation, the
Court will only defer to “persuasive” interpretations. Eskridge & Baer, supra.
104
Vance, 133 S. Ct. 2450.
105
Id. at 2439.
106
Id. at 2443 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
107
Id. at 2439, 2449.
108
Id. at 2454.
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See id.
110
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013).
111
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with the University of Texas as a faculty member.112 Administrators at
Parkland allegedly assured him that this was possible.113 Though this
assurance was not a formal job offer, Nassar resigned his position on the
University faculty.114 Importantly, in tendering his resignation, Nassar sent
a letter both to Levine’s supervisor, Dr. Fitz, and to some other employees
of the University, restating his prior complaints of discrimination based on
religion and ethnic origin.115 Thereafter, Parkland formally offered Nassar
the job, but then revoked the offer upon learning from Dr. Fitz that such an
arrangement would be inconsistent with the affiliation agreement between
Parkland and the University.116 Nassar filed suit claiming that Dr. Fitz’s
intervention leading to the revocation of the offer constituted retaliation
against Nassar for opposing unlawful discrimination.117
The existence of the agreement between the University and Parkland
did in fact justify the revocation of Nassar’s offer because it required
Parkland doctors to be members of the University’s faculty.118 But around
the time he alerted Parkland to this feature of the agreement, Fitz had
allegedly also stated a desire to clear Levine’s name.119 Thus, it was
unclear whether Fitz admonished the Hospital to withdraw the offer due to
a desire to follow the affiliation agreement strictly, or due to a desire to
retaliate against Nassar for his complaints of discrimination.120 Because
some evidence of each motive existed, the question presented for the Court
was whether a retaliation claim under Title VII requires proof of “but for”
causation, or whether it is sufficient to prove that a retaliatory motive was
one “motivating factor” among other legitimate causes of the challenged
decision.121
The Court held that “but for” causation is required.122 The majority
explained that Congress’s failure to explicitly include claims for retaliation
within its 1991 amendment to Title VII allowing for “motivating factor”
causation meant that the amended standard did not apply to such claims.123
In other words, and consistent with the Court’s reading of congressional

112

Id. at 2523–24.
Id.
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Id. at 2524.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.; see also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (making
actionable retaliation against an employee for opposing unlawful discrimination).
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See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523.
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Id. at 2524.
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See id. at 2523–24.
121
Id. at 2522–23.
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Id. at 2534.
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Id. at 2529.
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intent in the recent age discrimination case of Gross v. FBL Financial
Services Inc.,124 the decision of Congress to direct the “motivating factor”
language in the 1991 amendment to Title VII at unlawful employment
practices involving discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin, without mentioning retaliation, evidenced congressional
intent to exclude retaliation claims from the new “motivating factor”
standard.125
The Court also read the promulgation of the 1991 amendments as
inconsistent with the continued application of Price Waterhouse outside the
unlawful employment practices that are the subject of the 1991
amendments.126 In the majority’s view, Congress’s decision to amend the
statute specifically to adopt in part and alter in part the Price Waterhouse
framework was a sufficient indication of its intent to displace the federal
common law framework with a statutory one, and the limits of that statutory
framework should be determined based on the statute.127 Thus, the “mixed
motive” framework is now limited solely to the status-based discrimination
prohibitions found in Title VII.128
The Court also decided two cases in which it formulated decision rules
relating to subject matter jurisdiction under the federal employment
statutes. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,129 the first of these two
cases, presented a question of mootness under the collective action
provisions of the FLSA.130 The case involved the increasingly common
practice of using full settlement of an individual claim to “pick off” the
named plaintiff in a putative collective action under the FLSA to prevent
the certification of the collective action.131 Laura Symczyk sued her
employer under the FLSA seeking to recover for deductions of break time
from her pay even though she was sometimes required to work during her
break.132 She made her claim on behalf of herself, as well as on behalf of
others similarly situated, thus making the claim a putative collective
action.133
124

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2529.
126
Id. at 2534.
127
Id.
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See id.
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Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013).
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Id. at 1526; see also Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
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Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1527; see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (providing for collective actions, and
requiring that the non-named plaintiffs opt into the class, as opposed to forming the class through a
certification ruling by the judge and allowing non-named plaintiffs to opt out, as would be the case
under a typical class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)).
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Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1527.
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Under the more conventionally familiar procedures of the Rule 23(b)(3)
consumer class action, a plaintiff representative is required to procure the
court’s approval to certify the class, and then is required to provide each
member of the class with notice of the action and of the member’s right to
opt out of the class and pursue relief individually.134 The collective action
provisions of the FLSA, in contrast, require that any non-named plaintiff
wishing to participate in a collective action affirmatively file a notice opting
into the plaintiff class, meaning that no class exists until at least one
employee other than the plaintiff has opted in.135 At the time that Symczyk
filed her suit, no other employee had opted into the action.136 The addition
of even one absent employee to the suit through her filing of an affirmative
notice opting into the suit would have allowed at least a putative class to
form.137 But before any of Symczyk’s co-employees could opt into the
class, the employer presented Symczyk with a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment (a
formal settlement offer).138 The employer offered Symczyk all of the relief
to which she claimed to be entitled in exchange for dropping the suit.139
However, the employer’s offer, on its own terms, expired ten days later
when Symczyk failed to accept or reject it.140
Ordinarily, this failure to accept the offer should have placed Symczyk
in the same position as she would have been in if the offer had not been
made, other than exposing her to potential penalties under Rule 68.141
Nevertheless, in the district court, Symczyk conceded that her failure to
accept the settlement offer rendered her individual claim moot.142 On
appeal, the Third Circuit affirmatively ruled, based on circuit precedent,
that Symczyk’s claim was mooted by the expired offer.143 In the Supreme
Court, however, Symczyk did not file a cross-petition on the issue.144
Based on these acts of waiver (in the district court) and abandonment (in the
Response to the Petitioner’s Brief), the majority assumed the mootness of
Symczyk’s individual claim, and isolated the issue to one of “whether [a

134

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1527.
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See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
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Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1527; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 68.
139
Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1527.
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putative collective action under the FLSA] is justiciable when the lone
plaintiff’s individual claim becomes moot.”145
The Court held that the collective action cannot proceed under such
circumstances.146 Important to this resolution was the fact that, at the time
of the offer’s expiration, no other employee had yet opted to become part of
the suit.147 Taking Symczyk’s individual claim as moot, then, the Court
distinguished FLSA collective actions, in which no class has any legal
significance until an absent employee affirmatively opts into the class, from
traditional Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, in which the class’s interests acquire
independent legal significance as soon as certification is granted.148 Given
the lack of independent legal significance of the collective interests of
Symczyk’s absent co-workers, the Court held that Symczyk lacked a
personal stake in the controversy tied to litigating on behalf of them.149
Therefore, since her own individual claim was moot, the suit no longer
presented a live case or controversy.150
The other subject matter jurisdiction case was much simpler. Kloeckner
v. Solis151 presented only an issue of original subject matter jurisdiction
under the CSRA,152 and it therefore will affect only the initial decision of
where to file a lawsuit against a federal government employer, rather than
any substantive decision governing actions in the federal workplace or any
procedural decision of how to proceed in or prove an employment case after
filing.153 Moreover, the issue of original subject matter jurisdiction the
Court resolved in the case only affects appeals from decisions of the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) in what are termed “mixed cases,” and
only the subset of those cases that the MSPB dismisses on procedural
grounds.154 The Court in Kloeckner merely applied the very clear text of
the CSRA, rejecting an alternative reading that would have found a nontextual exception, so the Court did not really even formulate a decision rule
in the case through interpretation.155 Thus, in the grand scheme of the
Court’s employment law docket, it was, at best, a minor decision.
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Id. at 1526.
See id. at 1529.
Id.
Id. at 1530.
Id. at 1530–32.
Id. at 1532.
Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596 (2012).
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1105 (2012).
See Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 604.
Id. at 601–02.
Id. at 603–04.
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Nevertheless, it was a decision of the Court in the most recent term, so it
belongs among the cases reviewed here.
Carolyn Kloeckner, an employee of the federal Department of Labor
(DOL), filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, claiming that she
had been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex and
age.156 At the time she filed her suit, her case did not fall under the
jurisdiction of the MSPB, the administrative entity responsible for
adjudicating the claims of federal employees subjected to serious
employment actions, such as demotion or termination.157 Shortly thereafter,
however, the DOL terminated her employment.158
This termination was for cause, and was therefore subject to the review
of the MSPB.159 However, in addition to her challenge of the cause
determination, Kloeckner claimed that she had been terminated based on
her sex, age, or both.160 The combination of these two arguments made the
case a “mixed case”—one that involves both the cause-based protections of
the CSRA and the status-based protections of Title VII.161 At this point,
Kloeckner had a choice: she could continue with her prior EEOC charge as
to the alleged hostile work environment and simultaneously pursue her
MSPB mixed case, or she could litigate them one at a time.162
To conserve her discovery expenses, Kloeckner opted to pursue the
EEOC charge first.163 She requested leave to amend her EEOC charge to
include her discriminatory termination claim, and she asked the MSPB to
dismiss her case without prejudice for four months to allow that process to
come to a resolution.164 Both requests were granted.165 The MSPB
dismissed her mixed case without prejudice to her ability to re-file by the
earlier of January 18, 2007, or 30 days after a final decision in her EEOC
case.166
Kloeckner’s EEOC case was not resolved until long after her January
18, 2007 deadline, when the EEOC administrative law judge dismissed her
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Id. at 602. For the general procedures for filing such claims, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.105–.106
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Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (2012) (providing for MSPB review of tangible employment actions
involving job performance).
160
Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 602.
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case as a sanction for bad-faith discovery conduct and remanded it to the
DOL for a final decision.167 Once that decision was issued, Kloeckner
sought review before the MSPB.168 But the MSPB treated Kloeckner’s
appeal as an improper attempt to re-open her earlier mixed case long after
her right to re-file had expired and dismissed it as untimely.169 Kloeckner
then filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, but
the court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding
that Kloekner was required to file her suit initially in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, pursuant to the MSPB review
provisions of the CSRA.170
The CSRA provides for two avenues of review for a MSPB
determination.171 The first applies to general decisions of the MSPB
reviewing tangible employment actions.172 This avenue requires that an
action seeking review of the MSPB’s determination be filed directly in the
Federal Circuit.173 However, the relevant exception to this general rule
requires that, where a federal employee brings a mixed case, that employee
must seek review of the MSPB’s determination initially in the local federal
district court.174
The Government (as employer) contended that, despite the clear
exception to the Federal Circuit filing requirement for mixed cases,
Kloeckner was required to file initially in the Federal Circuit because the
MSPB had dismissed her appeal for procedural reasons, rather than on the
merits.175 The Court unanimously rejected this contention based on the
complete absence of any language in the statute drawing such a
distinction.176 Ultimately, this decision may have made it marginally more
expensive for federal employers to litigate mixed cases rejected by the
167

Id. at 602–03.
Id. at 603.
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Id.
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Id.; see also Kloeckner v. Solis, No. 4:09CV804–DJS, 2010 WL 582590, at *4 (E.D. Mo., Feb.
18, 2010).
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See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)–(b) (2012).
172
Id. § 7703(b)(1)(A).
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See id. (“Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and paragraph (2) of this subsection, a petition
to review a final order or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.”).
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See id. § 7703(b)(2) (“Cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702 of this
title shall be filed under section 717(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e–16(c)), section
15(c) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a(c)), and section 16(b) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. 216(b)), as applicable.”). This language
cross-references the filing requirements for rights of action under Title VII, the ADEA, and the FLSA,
all of which confer original subject matter jurisdiction on the federal district courts.
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MSPB on procedural grounds,177 but in the grand scheme of employment
litigation, it was of little significance.
So, the Court decided eight cases touching and concerning labor and
employment. One of these cases was of so little consequence that it is
difficult to draw any lessons from it other than that statutes mean what they
say. The other seven, I will contend in the next Part, served an interest in
procedural predictability, and did so to the great benefit of employers as
repeat players in the employment dispute resolution system.
III. PROCEDURAL PREDICTABILITY AND EMPLOYERS AS REPEAT PLAYERS
As descriptive theory of the Court’s OT 2012 work, and as a
complement to the existing accounts of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence in
labor, employment, and business litigation,178 I seek in this Part to outline
what I see as a governing principle for the Court’s working majorities in OT
2012. I call this principle “procedural predictability.” This Part will show
that a concern for procedural predictability—defined as the ability to know
at the earliest stage possible at what stage a dispute will resolve, and what it
will cost to resolve that dispute—animated almost all of the Court’s OT
2012 decisions. Further, the application of this principle overwhelmingly
favored employers as repeat players in the employment dispute resolution
system, regardless of whether the employer- or employee-side party
prevailed in each case before the Court.
Legal formalists such as Justice Antonin Scalia have long extolled the
virtues of “a law of rules,” or the setting down of bright-line rules of
decision to guide legal actors.179 Most such accounts defend formalist rule
development in part as protecting legal actors from uncertainty by fostering

177

It is plausible that the federal government, in its role as a repeat player in the system of
employment dispute resolution, lost both the immediate decision in Kloeckner and the long-term
benefits associated with the position it took in the case. Most plausibly, forcing all purely proceduralbased, mixed case MSPB decisions for review into the Federal Circuit could have saved the Government
some time and expense associated with litigating cases in local district courts, but the time and expense
saved, if any, would not likely be very great, especially considering that all merits-based, mixed case
MSPB decisions would still have to be reviewed in the local federal district courts. See supra notes
156–77 and accompanying text (discussing the Kloeckner decision).
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E.g., Bodie, supra note 3; Robin S. Conrad, The Roberts Court and the Myth of a Pro-Business
Bias, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 997 (2009); Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How
Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013); David L. Franklin, What Kind of
Business-Friendly Court?: Explaining the Chamber of Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1019 (2009).
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E.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989)
(introducing predictability as a justification for a rule-based jurisprudence: “Even in simpler times
uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law. Rudimentary justice requires that
those subject to the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”).
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predictability in the law.180 The sort of predictability that is most often the
subject of these accounts is the predictability that legal actors enjoy in
ordering their affairs outside the litigation context—what Justice Harlan
called “primary conduct.”181 The constitutional doctrine of vagueness as a
means of voiding statutes operationalizes this concern for predictability by
requiring that statutes allow a person of ordinary intelligence to be able to
discern what conduct they require or proscribe.182 In employment law,
common law doctrines such as the now-disfavored “fellow servant” rule
have attempted to serve this same interest in predictability in ordering one’s
daily affairs.183
In the Court’s recent labor and employment decisions, however, a
different concern for predictability is at work. The Court does not attempt
to clarify duties and rights under the law so that employers and employees
will know how to act toward one another in the workplace, or so that they
know what to expect from each other. Rather, the Court seems much more
concerned with formulating and clarifying rules of decision, so that
employers will know, at an early stage in each case, whether they will be
likely to win or not, how long it will take to win, and how much it will cost
to litigate to a resolution. The cases therefore evidence a strong preference
in the Court’s majorities for simplifying and shortening employment cases,
and little interest in tampering with the substantive duties and rights the
underlying claims advance.
To be sure, the individual outcomes of the remaining OT 2012 cases
favored the employer parties by almost a two-to-one margin. Employerside litigants won five of the eight cases reviewed above (Italian Colors,
Nitro-Lift, Vance, Nassar, and Symczyk), but the employee-litigants won the
other three (Sutter, McCutchen, and Kloeckner). And, excluding Kloeckner
(as either neutral or only speculatively harmful to the federal government as
an employer), the long-term litigation interests of employers as repeat
players in the employment dispute resolution system were favored in every
case. In each case, the Court, either explicitly in its reasoning or implicitly
in the rules it adopted, pursued a greater level of procedural predictability
180

Id.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). For an argument along
these lines, see, for example, Scalia, supra note 179, at 1179: “As laws have become more numerous,
and as people have become increasingly ready to punish their adversaries in the courts, we can less and
less afford protracted uncertainty regarding what the law may mean.”
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AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 284 (2003).
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John Fabian Witt, Rethinking the Nineteenth-Century Employment Contract, Again, 18 LAW &
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for employer-litigators. A close look at the cases will illustrate how this
occurred. I begin with the contract cases.
A. Procedural Predictability in the Contract Cases
The Court pursued procedural predictability in its contract cases not by
uniformly deciding such cases in favor of the employer-side parties.184 In
fact, half of the four contract drafting cases were decided in favor of the
employee-side litigants.185
Rather, the Court pursued procedural
predictability by illustrating through the opinion in each case contract
drafting strategies that, if employed, would have the effect of reducing the
costs for employers in future litigation.
Beginning with McCutchen, the Court’s lone ERISA case, recall that
the employee prevailed on his argument that principles of equity demanded
that his litigation costs be shared proportionally between the Plan and
him.186 A close look at the Court’s opinion, however, reveals that
McCutchen’s victory masked a more important victory for employers (in
this case the employer as benefits plan administrator) as repeat players.
McCutchen’s success at having the common fund doctrine applied to his
litigation costs depended on the majority’s conclusion that the Plan was
“silent” as to the allocation of such costs.187 As to the Plan’s right to
reimbursement itself, the Court unanimously applied the explicit terms of
the Plan, even where such application had the effect of taking money out of
McCutchen’s own pocket.188
Because a majority of the Court found (contrary to the parties’
stipulation that the Plan was unambiguous) that the Plan was “silent” as to
allocation of litigation costs, McCutchen was able to overcome the Plan’s
harsh explicit language regarding reimbursement.189 But the decision sends
a very clear signal to employers. If employers and benefit plan
administrators want to recover their expenses on covered health items out of
the proceeds of the insured’s litigation without having to assume a
proportional share of the expenses, all they need do is draft the plan so that
it is not “silent” as to the allocation of such expenses. In other words, the
unanimous portion of the Court’s decision stands for the proposition that
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the Court will apply the explicit language of an ERISA plan, even if
applying such language as written works a grave injustice on the insured,190
and the non-unanimous portion applying equity depends on the conclusion
that the Plan is silent, and therefore ambiguous, on an important term.191
Considering this unanimous holding in light of the majority’s finding
that the Plan was “silent” about the allocation of costs, then, the message to
employers is clear—draft your plans with clear allocation-of-costs
provisions, and they will be enforced as written, regardless of the injustice
that may result to the insured employees.192 Thus, in handing an equitybased victory to McCutchen, the Court pointed the way for employers and
benefit plan administrators to manage their litigation costs and increase the
predictability of their ultimate success when they must sue their covered
employees for reimbursement. The Court did this in one way or another in
all of its contract cases in OT 2012. The remaining cases of this type all
involved arbitration contracts, but each case in one way or another served
the interests in procedural predictability held by employers as repeat players
in the employment dispute resolution system.
Sutter’s resolution of a thorny issue created by a recent Supreme Court
arbitration decision redounds to the benefit of employers as repeat players.
Recall that the Court held in Stolt-Nielson that the parties to an arbitration
agreement must specifically agree to permit class arbitration in order for the
plaintiff to proceed on behalf of others in an arbitration.193 Under Sutter,
the rule of “specific agreement” set forth in Stolt-Nielson was clarified—
“specifically” does not necessarily mean “explicitly.”194 The rule of Sutter
requires only that the parties’ agreement can be interpreted to allow for
class arbitration, not that the agreement contain a specific provision
explicitly permitting class arbitration.195
Employers, therefore, may not count on the absence of any language in
the agreement relating to class treatment to prevent class arbitration.
Rather, to avoid class arbitration, employers must include a provision in the
arbitration agreement stating that the parties have not come to terms on
class arbitration, or that no portion of the agreement should be read to
authorize class arbitration, or even more certainly, that class arbitration is
not permitted under the agreement.
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Thus, although the arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement
to allow for class arbitration was upheld under the specific facts of the
Sutter case, the Court illuminated a clear path for employers to avoid the
same result in all future cases. Given the well-known imbalance in
negotiating power between employers and employees,196 it is a virtual
certainty that employment agreements and employment handbooks around
the country will be amended as a result of Sutter to include explicit
language prohibiting class arbitration, and that class arbitration in the
employment context will become a thing of the past. In terms of
employers’ interests in procedural predictability, then, the Sutter decision
constitutes another long-term victory, even though the employer-party lost
the case.
In Italian Colors, where no employer or employees were even parties
standing in those roles, the interests of employers as repeat players also
prevailed. The rule the Court adopted—that enforcing a class arbitration
prohibition even where individual litigation is cost-prohibitive does not
prevent the “effective vindication of a federal statutory right”197—will
greatly benefit employers as repeat players. Under Italian Colors, most
employees’ “effective vindication” arguments will fail unless employers
overreach and seek to secure prospective waivers of employees’ statutory
rights or impose confiscatory fees.198
Read together, then, Sutter and Italian Colors create a very robust
protection for explicit provisions in employment agreements prohibiting
class arbitration. It seems that such provisions will be enforced as written,
even where they appear to leave employees with largely illusory rights to
litigate individually. Thus, employers’ interests in procedural predictability
are now under the employers’ own protection—they need only draft their
class arbitration prohibitions carefully and explicitly, and they will be able
to avoid litigating in the aggregate.
The Court’s unanimous rejection in Nitro-Lift of a state court’s public
policy-based exception to the rule that the arbitrator decides all issues of
enforceability, save those regarding enforceability of the arbitration
provision itself, only reinforces this system of alternative dispute resolution
that affords employers significant control over their litigation costs.199 All
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employers must do now is adjust their drafting practices, and they will be
able to secure the arbitrability of their substantive agreements, to forestall
the most expensive and protracted litigation against them in the arbitration
system—class arbitration, and to know at the earliest stage in the process
whether they will be able to avoid such protraction.
B. Procedural Predictability in the Statutory Interpretation Cases
Although the Court’s service of employers’ interests in procedural
predictability is most evident in the results of the contract cases, the rules of
decision that the Court formulated in its statutory interpretation cases also
served these interests, albeit in different ways. Beginning with Vance and
Nassar, not only did the employers in those cases prevail in the cases
themselves, but they also secured a significant victory in each case for
employers in general as repeat players. In Vance, the University escaped
having to bear a burden of proof as to the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative
defense against its employee’s claim by winning on the issue of defining
who is a supervisor for the purposes of the defense.200 More importantly,
though, the University benefitted its own interests as a repeat player in the
system of employment dispute resolution, as well as the similar interests of
other employers, by securing not only a narrow definition of “supervisor,”
but also a bright-line, formalistic one.201
Recall that both Vance herself and the EEOC favored a fact-intensive,
case-by-case approach to who is a supervisor for the purposes of the
defense.202 But the Court essentially reduced the inquiry to the job
description: Did the employee in question have the power to hire, fire,
reassign, or alter salary or benefits?203 Going forward, this means that, if an
employer pays careful attention to the authority that each employee
possesses in relation to other employees, it will know at the earliest stage of
every hostile work environment case whether it will have to prove the
affirmative defense, or whether it will be able to prevail by simply
challenging the plaintiff’s proof of the University’s negligence in
responding to harassment.204 Such knowledge enhances the predictability
of the costs and duration of the suit, and accordingly makes settlement
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determinations much easier, much earlier.205 It goes without saying that
discovery will also be less expensive in such cases if employers no longer
have to gather information on the case-specific facts surrounding the
relationship between the plaintiff and the alleged harasser.206
The Court’s reasoning in Vance suggests that enhancing procedural
predictability for employers was one of the Court’s goals.207 In justifying
the adoption of the formalistic, bright-line inquiry for who is a supervisor,
Justice Alito reasoned as follows:
The interpretation of the concept of a supervisor that we adopt today is
one that can be readily applied. In a great many cases, it will be known
even before litigation is commenced whether an alleged harasser was a
supervisor, and in others, the alleged harasser’s status will become clear to
both sides after discovery. And once this is known, the parties will be in a
position to assess the strength of a case and to explore the possibility of
resolving the dispute. Where this does not occur, supervisor status will
generally be capable of resolution at summary judgment. By contrast,
under the approach advocated by petitioner and the EEOC, supervisor
status would very often be murky—as this case well illustrates.208

These concerns for procedural predictability trumped functionalist
concerns that a person who does not bear the title of supervisor, or who
does not have the immediate power to hire, fire, promote, demote, or
change salary or benefits, may nevertheless have a significant amount of
supervisory authority stopping short of those powers. Such authority might
enable—or assist—such an employee in creating an abusive working
environment for a co-employee, even absent the threat of an ultimate
employment action.209
The majority, confronted with these concerns, criticized the
functionalist alternative as insufficiently determinative.210 A particularly
good illustration of the majority’s hostility to a more open-ended approach
is its criticism of the Government’s attorney—who argued before the Court
in favor of the EEOC’s functionalist test—for being unable to specify, ex
ante, the percentage of an employee’s daily work that would have to be
made up of activities directed by a co-employee for that co-employee to be
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deemed a supervisor.211 In essence, then, the majority used a formalist
standard—that of procedural predictability—to evaluate the Government’s
functionalist test, and found it wanting.212 Vance will not protect employers
from being sued for hostile work environment harassment under Title
VII.213 But as a result of the Vance decision, employers as repeat players
have a simple way of determining early in the dispute resolution process
whether to settle a hostile work environment suit—simply look at the
allegedly harassing employee’s job description.
Nassar also secured a long-term victory for employers as repeat
players, and it grounded its decision on a similar justification based on the
desirability of procedural predictability.214 Recall that, in Nassar, the issue
was whether the “mixed motive” framework of Title VII’s antidiscrimination provisions applies to retaliation claims, and the University
employer won the appeal on that issue, meaning that Dr. Nassar would have
to prove his retaliation claim using the normal “but for” causation
framework.215 This ruling will have immediate effects in the workplace, as
it will now be less risky to discipline or terminate an employee who may
have engaged in protected activity while at the same time violating some
employer policy that would itself have justified the discipline or
termination. But this decreased risk will not, by itself, prevent lawsuits
against employers, and plaintiffs will still be able to win such lawsuits
where they can prove that, despite the plaintiff’s other conduct, the
employer would not have taken the challenged action absent a retaliatory
motive.216
Nevertheless, the rule of Nassar serves the interests of employers as
repeat players in such litigation because it removes a great deal of
uncertainty from the process of a retaliation case at a very early stage in the
process. Under the rule of Nassar, all employers know from the outset that
plaintiffs will have to meet the burden of proving that any justification the
employer offers for an allegedly retaliatory employment decision is
pretextual.217 A mixed motive theory allows the plaintiff to concede the
legitimacy of the employer’s proffered reason and go on to show that
retaliation was also the employer’s motive, forcing the employer to then
prove that it would have made the same decision even absent the retaliatory
211
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motive to avoid having to pay damages.218 But the Nassar rule reverses this
set of burdens. Under Nassar, the employer will escape liability unless the
employee proves that the employer would not have made the same decision
absent the retaliatory motive.219 Knowing this at the outset, employers can
adjust their discovery plans with an eye toward establishing the legitimate
reason for a decision and preventing the plaintiff from proving that it was
not the real reason (or even from proving that it was not one reason among
several), without having to worry about the employee ever shifting the
burden to them.
As it was in Vance, this concern for providing employers with
procedural predictability was an explicit justification for the Court’s
decision.220 In justifying the decision, Justice Kennedy first focused on the
recent increases in retaliation claims under Title VII, pointing out that such
claims are now second only to race claims in terms of their frequency.221
Justice Kennedy then posited that a less demanding causation standard
would “contribute to the filing of frivolous claims,” citing a hypothetical
vignette of a bad employee who, knowing that he or she is about to be
disciplined, makes “an unfounded charge of racial, sexual, or religious
discrimination” to manufacture a retaliation claim.222
Justice Kennedy’s vignette is somewhat dubious as an argument that
such frivolous claims will survive to the later stages of a suit (i.e., past the
summary judgment phase), considering the well-established rule that an
employer need not forego a planned action against an employee simply
because the employee has engaged in protected conduct since the decision
to take such action was made.223 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy conceded
only that the employer in such a situation “could escape judgment after
trial,” and he expressed concern that employing the motivating factor
standard of causation would make it more difficult for the employer to
dispose of the case at summary judgment.224 Justice Kennedy further
reasoned that “[i]t would be inconsistent with the structure and operation of
Title VII to so raise the costs, both financial and reputational, on an
employer whose actions were not in fact the result of any discriminatory or
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retaliatory intent.”225 As in Vance, therefore, the Court’s concern was not
that the employers be protected from suit per se, but that suits against them
be resolved as quickly and cheaply as possible.226 These concerns, and the
rule that the Court adopted in service of them, sound in procedural
predictability—the knowledge, at the earliest stage of the case, of how the
case will come out and how much time and money it will take to get to that
result.
The Court’s other major statutory interpretation case, Symczyk, served
these same interests in procedural predictability, albeit without employing
the explicit justifications found in Vance and Nassar. Recall that Symczyk
involved the increasingly common practice of an employer using a formal
settlement offer to “pick off” the named plaintiff in a putative collective
action under the FLSA before other employees are able to opt into the
suit.227 The Court held only that, once the named plaintiff is “picked off,”
the collective action becomes moot if no other employee has opted in yet.228
The benefits of the “pick-off” strategy are obvious. If the named
plaintiffs in collective actions can be picked off one by one before a class
can form, an employer can simultaneously accomplish two objectives.
First, the employer can prevent a putative collective action from becoming a
true collective action, and thereby prevent a small, inexpensive case from
becoming a large, expensive one.229 Second, the employer can prevent the
employee class from securing the normal efficiencies and economies of
class aggregation, thus making each individual claim more costly, on a perclaim basis, to litigate.230 As discussed above in the context of class
arbitration prohibitions, making each claim more costly to litigate can also
have the effect of preventing claims from ever being filed.231
In any event, knowing at the outset of a putative collective action that
the aggregation of claims can be prevented by picking off the named
plaintiff serves the employer’s interests in procedural predictability.
Moreover, knowing that, even if an Offer of Judgment is not accepted, the
same result will be obtained, as long as the Offer is for all of the relief the
plaintiff seeks, further serves the employer’s interests in predictability.232
Thus, for employers as repeat players in the employment dispute resolution
system, the most desirable outcome for the Symczyk case would have been
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for the Court to endorse the decision of the Third Circuit holding that an
unaccepted Offer of Judgment for all of the relief the plaintiff seeks moots
the plaintiff’s individual claim,233 which then moots the entire putative
collective action. The least desirable outcome would have been for the
Court to explicitly reject the Third Circuit’s rule on mooting the
individual’s claim, which would have had the effect of reversing its ruling
on mooting the collective action.
The Court took a path between these options that, on balance, favored
the interests of employers as repeat players. By assuming the mootness of
Symczyk’s claim and holding that mooting her claim mooted the putative
collective action,234 the Court preserved the (imperfect, but real) procedural
predictability that prevailed under the Third Circuit’s opinion, without
explicitly endorsing the rule that the individual’s claim is mooted through
her failure to accept the employer’s Offer of Judgment.235
As Justice Kagan pointed out in her colorful and humorous dissent, a
case with such an important element abandoned or waived is not likely to
come before the Court again, so the effect of the Court’s decision in
establishing a durable principle of mootness is likely to be minimal at
best.236 But in preserving the most important parts of the status quo, and
enabling such preservation through the clever use of the Court’s “assume
without deciding” power,237 the majority preserved the “pick off” device as
a way for employers to manage their litigation exposure at the outset of an
FLSA case, at least until the Third Circuit’s individual mootness rule comes
before the Court properly. By preserving this device, the Court in Symczyk
preserved the ability of employers to manage the procedural predictability
of their own cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have sought through this brief review of the Court’s OT 2012 labor
and employment-related cases to identify a principle that animated the
Court’s decisions. That principle is procedural predictability for employers,
a principle that, as applied in the OT 2012 cases, assists employers as repeat
players in the employment dispute resolution system by allowing them to
233
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understand and manage their likely costs in the early stages of an
employment dispute.
The general idea of predictability in the law animates any formalist
jurisprudence.238 Chief Justice Roberts’s statement at his confirmation
hearing comparing judging to umpiring was interpreted by many as staking
a claim to formalist judging,239 and it has generated some interest and
commentary as to the Court’s formalist tendencies.240 To date, none of this
work has focused on procedural predictability, as I have defined it, as a
feature of the Court’s ostensible formalism. It would therefore be worth
examining the Roberts Court’s entire work product in the area of labor and
employment, or perhaps in the general area of business litigation, to see
whether the procedural form of predictability identified here exerts the
normative force in that body of work that it exerted in the Court’s OT 2012
labor and employment-related cases.
This Article has begun what will likely be an ongoing inquiry by
defining the principle, identifying the ways in which the Court pursued it in
the most recent term, and outlining the benefits that it affords employers as
repeat players in the employment dispute resolution system.

238

See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 179.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts Jr.,
nominee to be C.J. of the United States).
240
See, e.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging
Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1199–1200 (2007). In fact, at least one
observer has posited that an interest in the formalist concerns for greater predictability and certainty in
the law was a driver of some of the Court’s business-related decisions in earlier terms. See Conrad,
supra note 178, at 1013–14 (explaining that business victories during the first few years of the Roberts
Court’s tenure can be explained in part by a desire for predictability in the law). The cases identified by
Conrad illustrate concerns for substantive predictability—the predictability that the same substantive
rules will apply in similar cases, and that liability will not be expanded beyond reasonable limits. Id.
239

